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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
ARREST, SEARCH, AND CONFESSIONS
by
S. Michael McColloch*
HIS Article examines the most significant developments in the law of
arrest, search, and confessions over the past year manifested primar-
ily by decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and applica-
ble federal opinions. The Article also emphasizes rulings that signify or
illuminate the general trends in the courts on the most consequential and
controversial issues. On balance the current Survey period stands in sharp
contrast to recent Survey years in this area, which were heavily character-
ized by the steady dilution of established procedural safeguards for the ac-
cused, and the judicial accession of the Texas courts to minimum federal
standards of protection. While the pendulum may not yet have completed
its swing in that direction, this year's decisions, particularly on the most
salient search and seizure issues, reflect a degree of greater restraint. The
recent decisions also evidence an attempt to constructively refine and enforce
the rights of the accused against the power of the state at the earliest critical
stages of the criminal justice process.
I. PRETEXT ARRESTS
One of the more surprising developments during the Survey period in-
volved the overruling of recent precedent by both the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals and a panel of the Fifth Circuit to hold that an arrest or other
detention for one offense as a pretext in furtherance of the investigation into
another offense renders any evidence obtained as a result thereof inadmissi-
ble under the Fourth Amendment. In Black v. State I officers obtained infor-
mation leading them to suspect the connection of the defendant with a
recent murder, but lacked probable cause to arrest him for the crime. While
conducting surveillance of his residence, the officers watched the suspect de-
part in an automobile. The police followed the suspect in an unmarked car.
The officers observed him commit several minor traffic violations, pulled him
over, and arrested him. They told the defendant that they wanted to ques-
tion him about the murder and several hours later obtained a confession.
The trial court admitted the confession over objection.2
* B.A., Washington and Lee University; J.D., St. Mary's University School of Law.
Attorney at Law, Bruner, McColl & McColloch, Dallas, Texas.
1. 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
2. Id. at 241. The only information the police possessed to connect the defendant to the
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In the lead plurality opinion, the court of criminal appeals noted that it
had discussed the pretext arrest doctrine in several of its older opinions, 3 but
had never conclusively adopted it.4 The court then turned to the twenty-
year old Fifth Circuit decision of Amador-Gonzalez v. United States5 that
struck down a stop of a suspect as a pretext arrest on facts materially indis-
tinguishable from those presented in Black.6 Stressing that the arresting of-
ficer in Black admitted that the reason he arrested the defendant was to
question him about the homicide, the court of criminal appeals concluded
that the officers simply used the traffic violations as a pretext to get around
the warrant requirement. 7 The defendant's detention, therefore, was illegal8
even though the officers had probable cause to make the traffic stop and take
the defendant into formal custody merely because of the traffic violations.9
In the wake of Black, such arrests will not justify a resultant search or con-
fession on another offense so long as the evidence conclusively demonstrates
that the officer's true motive for making the arrest is to further his investiga-
tion on the other offense.' 0
The Fifth Circuit had reached exactly the same conclusion several months
earlier in United States v. Causey. I I In Causey city police officers wanted to
murder was a statement by the defendant's brother that the defendant was in possession of a
stolen .25-caliber automatic weapon, the fact that the deceased had been killed with a .25-
caliber weapon, and that the defendant lived in the same vicinity. Curiously, the court of
appeals concluded that, in conjunction with the defendant's traffic infractions, this information
constituted probable cause to arrest the defendant. Id. The court of criminal appeals easily
concluded that based on this little information, police had no probable cause to justify arrest-
ing the defendant. Id. at 243.
3. See Gutierrez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); McDonald v.
State, 415 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967); Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67, 71-72 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
4. 739 S.W.2d at 244-45. In these earlier cases, the courts consistently determined that
the officers involved were unaware of the arrestee's possible involvement in the more serious
crime until after the arrest for the minor offense. See, e.g., Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1978); Guitterez, 502 S.W.2d at 748; McDonald, 415 S.W.2d at 202; Adair, 427
S.W.2d at 67.
5. 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
6. In Amador-Gonzalez the officers observed the defendant because they suspected his
involvement in a narcotics transaction. At the trial the officer admitted that the real reason he
wanted to stop the defendant was to search for narcotics. The officer was a narcotics officer
who did not normally make traffic arrests and possessed no ticket book. The officer did not
write out the traffic tickets at the time of the arrest and he delayed for some time between
observing the traffic offenses and stopping the defendant. Id. at 314.
7. 739 S.W.2d at 245.
8. Id.
9. The court of criminal appeals recently made it clear that a full-custody arrest is per-
missible for any nonspeeding traffic violations, or even for the operation of a motor vehicle that
could not pass vehicle inspection. See Williams v. State, 726 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986). The officers in Black saw the defendant driving without headlights, running stop signs,
and driving on the wrong side of the road. The officers also noticed the absence of a light over
the license plate of the car, as required by statute.
10. The Black court remanded the case to the court of appeals for a determination as to
whether the defendant's confession was admissibly nevertheless on grounds that intervening
events broke the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession. Black, 739
S.W.2d at 245, citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975); Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662,
665-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
11. 818 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1987).
[Vol. 42
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
question a suspect about a bank robbery, but lacked probable cause to arrest
him. The officers then uncovered a seven year old outstanding warrant on
the suspect for failure to appear in court on a misdemeanor theft charge.
The police arrested him, using the theft charge as a pretext to question the
suspect about the robbery. The court did not question the validity of the
outstanding warrant, but the officers admitted that the sole reason for mak-
ing the arrest was to gain the opportunity for custodial interrogation of the
suspect regarding the bank robbery. Subsequent to the interrogation, the
defendant confessed to an FBI agent. The prosecution introduced the con-
fession at trial in order to obtain the defendant's conviction on a federal
bank robbery charge.
As did the court of criminal appeals in Black, the Fifth Circuit panel in
Causey found Amador-Gonzalez controlling, even though more recent prece-
dent in the circuit had reached precisely the opposite conclusion. 12 The
panel noted that in United States v. Cavallino 13 the court had refused to
suppress evidence obtained by interrogating a defendant taken into custody
through a substantially similar pretextual arrest. 14 The Causey panel
quickly overruled Cavallino as an aberration in Fifth Circuit case law. 15 The
panel also was concerned that the holding in Cavallino would encourage of-
ficers to use minor infractions of statutes as a means of incarcerating citizens
while ignoring their right to freedom, the degree of the violation, or the gov-
ernment's ability to prone a more serious violation of a criminal statute.1 6
The panel therefore ruled that a confession obtained as a result of an arrest
made pursuant to a valid warrant is nevertheless inadmissible if the officer
involved really made the arrest solely to enable the police to interrogate the
detainee about another, unrelated matter; particularly if the arresting officer
has no intention to prosecute the suspect for the minor crime on which the
arrest was based.17 The panel stressed that courts objectively assess the cir-
cumstances to determine an officer's true intentions in such a situation.18
12. Id. at 361.
13. 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974).
14. Id. at 1207. The police officers' superior in Cavallino directed the officers to follow the
defendant, and to arrest him when he committed any kind of traffic violation, and to interro-
gate him about another offense. The Cavallino panel held that the confession to the major
offense, obtained as a result of that questioning, was admissible. The panel did so without even
mentioning Amador-Gonzalez, which directly conflicted with its ruling and should have con-
trolled. Id.
15. 818 F.2d at 361. Several en banc decisions had followed the reasoning of Amador-
Gonzalez. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Davis, 423 F.2d 974, 977-78 (5th
Cir. 1970). See also, United States v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir. 1979) (evidence
admissable when defendant's car searched after divest for "wrong" offense); Moffett v. Wain-
wright, 512 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1975) (confession obtained from unlawful detention ex-
cluded); United States v. Saunders, 476 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1973) (marijuana obtained during
warrantless search for fugitives was valid seizure); Chaney v. Wainwright, 460 F.2d 1263, 1264
(5th Cir. 1972) (where officer inaccurately named offense, search and discovery of evidence still
valid if search was for probable cause).
16. 818 F.2d at 360.
17. Id. at 360-61.
18. Id. at 358; see Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136-38 (1978) (Court upheld
government's contention that "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does not make otherwise lawful
1988]
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For this objective assessment the court looked to the fact that the officer did
not make the arrest on the outstanding warrant in the course of routine po-
lice activity nor in accordance with internal police policies. 19 Thus, a police
officer's protestations at a suppression hearing claiming a subjective intent to
actually prosecute on the minor offense will not foreclose the operation of
the pretext arrest doctrine, so long as the facts and circumstances surround-
ing the arrest and subsequent interrogation, when viewed objectively by the
court, conflict with the officer's stated intent. Although the precise scope
and applicability of the pretext arrest doctrine is far from settled,20 its revi-
val this past year, in both Texas and the Fifth Circuit, signifies an apparent
judicial unwillingness to continue unabated the steady dilution of Fourth
and Fifth Amendment procedural safeguards noted in recent Surveys.
II. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
During the Survey period, both the United States Supreme Court and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals carefully delineated and arguably limited
the scope and application of the frequently invoked "plain view" exception
to the warrant requirement. The Supreme Court first recognized the plain
view doctrine in 1971 in Coolidge v. New Hampshire21 when a plurality held
that the Fourth Amendment justifies under certain circumstances a warrant-
less seizure by police of an item that comes within plain view during their
lawful search of a private area.22 The Coolidge opinion identified three re-
quirements that a police officer must satisfy before the plain view doctrine
conduct illegal or unconstitutional," but found that circumstances, viewed objectively, justified
action taken); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987) (arrest upheld
because in good faith and enforcement scheme had considered unrelated crimes as necessary).
19. 818 F.2d at 358. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE; A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 52(e), at 460 and n. 110 (2d ed. 1987).
20. The unanimous Causey panel opinion is currently under rehearing before the en banc
fifth circuit court. In two other cases during the Survey period, other panels of the Fifth
Circuit upheld arrests that were arguably pretextual in nature, but under different circum-
stances from those presented in Causey. In United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th
Cir. 1987), the court held that a warrantless arrest for failure to carry automobile insurance
was consistent with Fourth Amendment strictures against a pretext arrest challenge, because
the district court found that the officer effected the arrest in good faith, and because the Texas
enforcement scheme necessarily contemplated investigatory stops for unrelated crimes. In
United States v. Johnson, 815 F.2d 309, 314-16 (5th Cir. 1987) the court found that an argua-
bly pretextual inventory search following an arrest pursuant to an out-of-state warrant did not
violate the Fourth Amendment; because the district court found that no pretext existed, and
because the secret service possessed a legitimate interest in effecting the suspect's arrest. The
United States Supreme Court has yet to directly confront the question. The Court has stated
that its decision in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), was influenced by the fact
that there was "no suggestion whatever that this standard procedure... was a pretext conceal-
ing an investigatory police motive." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); see
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) (investigating abandoned car did not prove to
be pretext for police intent). The court in Robinson did not address, however, the resolution of
the result required when a police officer "used the subsequent traffic violation arrest as a mere
pretext.. 414 U.S. at 221 n. 1. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari in Missouri v.
Blair, 474 U.S. 1049 (1986), a case that might have presented this issue, but later dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted. 107 S. Ct. 1596, 94 L. Ed. 2d 679 (1987).
21. 403 U.S. 443, 444 (1971).
22. Id. at 465-471.
[Vol. 42
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
applies: (1) the police officer must be engaged in a lawful initial intrusion or
otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view the object to be
seized; (2) the officer must discover the object inadvertently; and (3) it must
be immediately apparent to the officer that the object he observes is evidence
of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.23 The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals essentially has adopted the plain view doctrine as a
matter of state constitutional law. 24 Neither the Supreme Court nor the
court of criminal appeals has precisely articulated the meaning of the third
prong of the doctrine, which states the illegality or evidentiary nature of the
observed item must be "immediately apparent" to the officer. The Texas
court indicated in 1981 that the officer must virtually be certain of the ob-
ject's criminality in order to trigger the doctrine, 25 but the Supreme Court
later reversed that decision as requiring "an unduly high degree of certainty
as to the incriminatory character of evidence." '26 The Court, however, ex-
pressly reserved the issue of whether mere reasonable suspicion or full-
fledged probable cause was required in this context.27
The Court subsequently held in Arizona v. Hicks28 that police must estab-
lish probable cause to satisfy the immediately apparent element of the plain
view doctrine. 29 The police in Hicks entered the defendant's apartment,
from which someone had fired a bullet through the floor, striking and injur-
ing a man in the apartment below. They entered the apartment to search for
the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons. Although they found sev-
eral weapons, the officers also noticed two sets of expensive stereo compo-
nents, which appeared out of place in the squalid and otherwise ill-appointed
four-room apartment. Suspecting that they were stolen, one of the officers
moved a turntable to view and record the serial number. He then reported
by phone to his headquarters, which subsequently advised the officer that the
turntable had been stolen in an armed robbery. A grand jury later indicted
the defendant for the robbery, and the defendant moved to suppress the evi-
dence seized. 30 The Hicks majority, moved by the warning in Coolidge that
23. Id. at 465-69; DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 289-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
24. Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex Crim. App. 1983). Brown was a controver-
sial plurality opinion involving the plain view doctrine that declared that the Texas judiciary
should not interpret the state constitution any differently from the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the federal constitution, at least with regard to search and seizure issues. Id. at 799.
Although arguably dicta, a majority of the court later embraced this aspect of Brown in Osban
v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
25. Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
26. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983).
27. Id. at 742 n.7. The Court had, however, noted in dicta in Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 587 (1980), that the police must meet the standard of probable cause observing that
"the seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively
reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activ-
ity." 460 U.S. at 741-42.
28. 107 S. Ct. 1149, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1987).
29. Id. at 1153, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 351.
30. Id. at 1152, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 350. The Arizona trial court granted the motion to
suppress, and the Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed. 146 Ariz. 533, 707 P.2d 331 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1985). The Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and the State filed for certiorari.
107 S. Ct. at 1152, 94 L. Ed.2d at 350.
1988]
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"the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges,"13 1 noted that the officer's moving of the turntable constituted a
search, separate and apart from the initial lawful objective of the entry onto
the premises. 32 Although the Court would permit mere inspection of those
parts of the turntable that came into view, since such an inspection would
not constitute an independent search, the movement of the turntable only a
few inches produced a new invasion of the defendant's privacy that one
could not justify by the circumstances that validated the entry in the first
place. 33 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in his first opinion on criminal
procedure, wrote that to hold that a standard less than probable cause is
required would be to deny the plain view doctrine's theoretical and effective
background. 34
The Court could find no reason why an object should be subject to search
or seizure on lesser grounds in the plain view context than is needed to ob-
tain a warrant for that same object if the object is known to be on the prem-
ises in the first place.3 5 Significantly, the Court did recognize the possible
chilling effect that this probable cause requirement could place on law en-
forcement activities, but noted that the law sometimes insulates a few from
proper punishment in the effort to protect the privacy of all.3 6
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied and refined the Hicks analy-
sis several weeks later in White v. State,3 7 which presented the court with a
similar exploratory search by officers for stolen property in a residence. Re-
sponding to a disturbance call, two El Paso police officers properly entered
an apartment to check for damage, but found none. During their inspection,
however, one of the officers observed a credit card that did not match the
names of the tenants. The officer telephoned the police department, but the
department informed him that no one had reported the card stolen. The
officer then proceeded to look around the apartment further, and observed a
large amount of jewelry, stereo equipment, and other property. He again
checked with the police department after identifying the property until ulti-
mately several of the items in the apartment indeed turned out to be reported
as stolen.3 8 The court of criminal appeals had no trouble39 concluding that a
31. 107 S. Ct. at 1154, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 352 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466).
32. 107 S. Ct. at 1152, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 350.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1153, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 351.
35. Id. at 1154, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 352.
36. Id. at 1155, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 353. Justice O'Connor, writing for the three dissenting
justices, would have carved out an exception for the mere "cusory examination of items in
plain view" that permit such searches upon reasonable suspicion less than probable cause. 107
S. Ct. at 1159, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 357. Perhaps surprisingly, she alternatively opined that police
actually satisfied the probable cause standard with regard to the criminality of the stereo
equipment, which she observed as both inordinately expensive in relation to its surroundings
and known to be a favored target of larcenous activity. Id. at 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 358. The
state, however, conceded on appeal that it had not shown probable cause.
37. 729 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
38. Id. at 739. The El Paso Court of Appeals upheld the search under the plain view
doctrine in an unpublished opinion. White v. State, No. 08-84-00348-CR (Tex. App.-El
Paso, 1985, pet. granted). The El Paso court cited Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543, 75
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court could not justify the officer's systematic investigation of the various
items of property as a legitimate plain view search. 4° In doing so, the court
arguably has expanded the Supreme Court's holding in Hicks. The Supreme
Court invalidated the search of the suspected turntable because the officer
moved it to view the serial number underneath while he lacked probable
cause. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, however, disapproved even
the mere inspection of the articles for identifying characteristics in open
view. The court of criminal appeals came to its conclusion on the basis that
the investigation was systematic and exploratory, and because the police had
to take further investigative steps before probable cause developed.4 1 The
Texas court thereby placed primary emphasis on the immediate nature of
the probable cause required. 42 The court also concluded that the deliberate
and systematic nature of the officer's inspection of each item ran afoul of the
inadvertent discovery requirement of the plain view doctrine. 43 The court
observed that evidence an officer purposefully seeks out is not in "plain
view."44
III. STANDING
In Chapa v. State4 5 the court of criminal appeals significantly refined the
L. Ed. 2d 502, 510 (1988) for the proposition that "the seizure of property in plain view is
presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with
criminal activity." Id. The lower Court noted that "there was no seizure of the goods until
the officer had established through the complaining witness that her property was located in
the appellant's apartment." 729 S.W.2d at 739.
39. 729 S.W.2d at 742. The White court unanimously reversed the court of appeals, with
two judges concurring, without separate opinion, in the result only.
40. Id. at 741. In previous opinions, the court of criminal appeals had expressly applied
the plain view doctrine only against the seizure of property when the officer did not have
reason to believe that the property was evidence, or the fruit of a crime. See, e.g., Sullivan v.
State, 626 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980); Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Turner v.
State, 550 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The White court has now expressly ex-
tended the doctrine to cover searches conducted in this context where the officer had some
reason to believe the property was criminally suspect. 729 S.W.2d at 741.
41. Id. at 741.
42. Id. The court in White did not address the applicability of the collective knowledge
doctrine to the plain view exception. The court of criminal appeals first recognized the collec-
tive knowledge approach in Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984),
in which the court held that the collective knowledge of all law enforcement personnel and
agencies connected with a case can be considered in determining whether probable cause ex-
ists, even though the arresting officer or agency does not possess sufficient information to add
up to probable cause. See Bain v. State, 677 S.W.2d 51, 55-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). But cf
United States v. Sanchez, 689 F.2d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 1982) (considered total knowledge of all
police officials along with inferences from the circumstances). One could clearly show prob-
able cause in White under the standard in Sanchez, which would have justified the officer's
inspection of the property as well as its seizure. Although Woodward and White are difficult to
reconcile, courts will not likely apply the collective knowledge mode of analysis to the plain
view situation. To do so would eviscerate the Supreme Court's rationale in Hicks and en-
courage the very sort of general exploratory search that the immediately apparent and inadver-
tent requirements were designed to prohibit. Hicks v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1153, 94 L. Ed.2d
347, 351 (1987).
43. 729 S.W.2d at 742.
44. Id.; See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980).
45. 729 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
1988]
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scope of recognized privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment.46
Almost a decade ago in Rakas v. Illinois,47 the Supreme Court effectively
merged the substantive question of what constitutes a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment with the procedural issue of "standing" to contest a
search. 48 The Court essentially held that, by definition, no search takes
place as to a particular individual by virtue of certain governmental action
unless that individual possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
area searched.49 The litmus test for determining the existence of such legiti-
mate expectation of privacy as to a particular accused is twofold:
(1) whether the accused's conduct exhibited an actual, subjective expectation
of privacy; and (2) if it did, whether that subjective expectation was one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 50 The Court thereby con-
cluded that mere passengers in an automobile who failed to assert any prop-
erty or possessory interest in the automobile, or an interest in the contraband
seized, did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compart-
ment or the area under the seat of the vehicle.51 The passengers thus did not
have standing to challenge the search of those areas. The court did not deem
it determinative of whether the passengers had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the particular areas of the automobile searched based on the mere
fact that they were legitimately on the premises, in the sense that they were
in the car with the permission of its owner.52
In Chapa the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was confronted with a
similar factual scenario to that presented in Rakas, but the defendant
demonstrated more than mere legitimate presence in the premises searched.
After waiting for a late city bus in Houston, the defendant and his wife
stepped into a lounge to call a taxicab. A friend later joined them and they
all got into the cab when it arrived. The defendant sat in the front seat next
to the driver while his wife and friend sat in the back seat. They instructed
the driver to take them to their hotel. As the cab began to pull out of the
driveway of the lounge, two Houston police officers stopped the cab. The
police officers removed the defendant from the cab and the officers began to
search the area under and around the front seat. After several minutes of
searching, the officers discovered an aluminum foil packet under the front
seat that contained heroin. The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in
Houston relied upon Rakas in upholding the state's challenge to the defend-
ant's standing. 53 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals employed a more
46. Id. at 727-29.
47. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
48. Id. at 142-49.
49. Id. at 149.
50. Id. at 148-49. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (expectation of pri-
vacy in phone numbers dialed not legitimate nor reasonable).
51. 439 U.S. at 149.
52. Id. at 149. Prior to Rakas the law conferred "automatic standing" upon defendants
charged with possessory offenses. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960) (when
issuance of search warrant based on information receives through an informant). The Court
expressly abandoned the rule in Jones subsequent to Rakas. See U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,
95 (1980).
53. Chapa v. State, 694 S.W.2d 202, 203 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.], 1985, pet.
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meaningful Rakas analysis and reached the opposite conclusion. Arguably
enlarging the Supreme Court's view of reasonable privacy expectations, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals essentially held that a defendant's denial of
any ownership or possessory interest in the area searched or object seized
does not defeat standing, as long as some right of control can be shown to
that area or object.5 4 After noting that the defendant in Chapa had ade-
quately demonstrated his subjective expectation of privacy in the area under
the seat of the taxicab,5 5 the court refined the test for the objectively reason-
able expectation of privacy by including a right to control the property or
area, in addition to the previously recognized ownership and possessory
rights. 56 Thds, although the defendant asserted neither a property nor a
possessory interest in the taxicab he rode in, he nevertheless exercised a sig-
nificant degree of control over the vehicle. As a presumptively paying fare
he could determine its destination for the duration of his presence therein.
Moreover, the defendant and his companions possessed the legal right to
exclude others from the cab during their ride.57 The court therefore deter-
mined that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the cab
and, therefore, had standing to challenge the search of the area under the
front seat of the taxicab.5 8 The court thereby made it clear that resolution of
the existence of an objective expectation in this context can be determined by
reference to extraneous concepts of real or personal property law or to un-
granted). The court of appeals actually missed the point entirely by confusing case authority
involving the warrant requirement with the Rakas issue of whether a search has occurred at all
as to the particular defendant. The Chapa court of appeals cited and relied upon California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), to find that a taxicab customer cannot have an expectation of
privacy in the passenger compartment because of the mobile nature of taxicabs and the licens-
ing and registration regulation involving them. 694 S.W.2d at 203. In Carney, however, the
Supreme Court merely held that motor homes can, under certain circumstances, fall under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 471 U.S. at 392. Cases such as Carney,
which deal with the various exceptions to the warrant requirement, have nothing to do with
the issue of standing or probable cause to search.
54. 729 S.W.2d at 727-28.
55. Id. at 727. The defendant testified at the suppression hearing that upon entering the
taxicab he did in fact have an expectation of privacy therein. In conjunction with that testi-
mony, the court of criminal appeals easily concluded that the defendant's getting into the cab,
closing the door and getting out, was conduct sufficient to manifest a subject expectation of
privacy in the passenger compartment. Id.
56. Id. at 727-28. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals actually derived this concept
from a footnote in Rakas when the Supreme Court observed as follows:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property
law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of
the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others... and one
who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.
439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
57. 729 S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The court referred to common city
ordinances granting taxicab customers the right to exclude others, quoting from Houston's
City Code § 46-29 (1985), which provides that "any passenger who engages the services of a
taxicab shall have the exclusive right to the passenger compartment of the taxicab and it shall
be unlawful for a taxicab driver or permitee to carry additional passengers unless specific per-
mission is obtained from the passenger who engaged the taxicab originally."
58. 729 S.W.2d at 729.
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derstandings that society recognizes and permits in general. 59 Thus, a de-
fendant who disclaims ownership and possession of a particular place or
thing, but who can nevertheless demonstrate some legal, reasonable or cus-
tomary right to control the property or exclude others therefrom, will retain
his standing to challenge a search of the property in question. 6°
IV. D.W.I. ROADBLOCKS
The use of roadblocks by law enforcement agencies, primarily for the pur-
pose of detecting and apprehending driving while intoxicated (DWI) offend-
ers, has become increasingly popular since the United States Supreme
Court's 1979 dicta in Delaware v. Prouse.6 1 The dicta suggested that non-
random stops for the purpose of checking driver's licenses might pass consti-
tutional muster.62 The Court in Prouse specifically held that arbitrarily
detaining an automobile and driver in order to check the driver's license and
the automobile's registration was unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment except when police possessed articulable and reasonable suspicion that
the driver was unlicensed or that an automobile was unregistered or other-
wise in violation of the law.6 3 The Court noted, however, that its holding
did not prevent officials from developing methods for spot checks that do not
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion of police officers, specifically
stating that questioning all traffic at roadblock type stops might create a
possible alternative."
Despite this apparent invitation by the Supreme Court, the State of Texas
subsequently attempted to justify roadblocks under a statute that purport-
edly allowed any peace officer to detain a motor vehicle operator for a
driver's license check. 65 The obvious purpose of the roadblocks, however,
went beyond the mere checking for driver's licenses. 66 Texas courts and
legislators may have necessarily relied on this statute, as opposed to the Con-
stitutional theory opened up by Prouse, because of the Texas requirement of
specific statutory authority to justify an arrest. 67 No express statutory au-
59. See note 55 and accompanying text.
60. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals expressly limited its holding in Chapa to the
Fourth Amendment. 729 S.W.2d at 729. The defendant in Chapa did not raise, and the court
of criminal appeals did not decide, the question of whether he had standing to challenge the
search of the taxi under art. 1, § 9 of the Texas Constitution.
61. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
62. Id. at 663.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b, § 13 (Vernon 1977). The pertinent portion of
the statute states that "any peace officer may stop and detain any motor vehicle operator for
the purpose of determining whether such person has an owner's license as required by this
Section." Id.
66. See Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (court held police
search of marijuana possession unreasonable when conducted at owner's license check).
67. Under Texas law any arrest of a person without a warrant and without probable cause
is deemed an unreasonable seizure unless the arrest was specifically authorized by statute.
Courts are to construe statutes authorizing such arrests strictly. See Lowrey v. State, 499
S.W.2d 160, 164-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Honeycutt v. State, 299 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1963); Heath v. Boyd, 175 S.W.2d 214, 216, 141 Tex. 569, 571 (1943). State law
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thority in Texas permits detentions of citizens without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion except for Article 6687b. Three years ago in Meeks v.
State68 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals struck down these multi-pur-
pose roadblock stops as a violation of Article 6687b, noting that the statute
by its very terms restricted itself to driver's license checks, which police
could not use as subterfuge to a cover up a search and seizure not based by
on probable cause or reasonable suspicion.69
The court of criminal appeals finally addressed the constitutionality of
DWI roadblocks during the Survey period in the long-awaited decision in
Webb v. State.70 The prosecution, precluded by Meeks from seriously rely-
ing upon the driver's license statute, argued that the roadblock was neverthe-
less reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in light of Prouse.71 Indeed,
the evidence in Webb clearly established that the primary purpose of the
roadblock was to check for DWI offenders. The Dallas Court of Appeals
had concluded that the DWI roadblock ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment
despite the dicta in Prouse.72 That court determined that the roadblock
failed under the three-pronged analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Texas.73 Under Brown a court must consider the public concern
that the seizure serves, the degree to which the seizure promotes the public
interest, and the degree of interference with individual liberty caused by the
seizure.74 The Dallas Court of Appeals found that the state failed to satisfy
governs the legality of warrantless arrests, provided the restrictions on the authority to arrest
are at least as stringent as those imposed by the United States Constitution. Milton v. State,
549 S.W.2d 190, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
68. 692 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
69. Id. at 508. See McMillan v. State, 609 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hall
v. State, 488 S.W.2d 788, 789-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Although the continued viability of
art. 6687b, § 13 is highly doubtful in light of Prouse, the multi-purpose roadblock could not
pass muster even under the statute's broad terms. 692 S.W.2d 504, 508. Due to the fact that
the trial in Meeks occurred prior to the Supreme Court's Prouse decision, the court of criminal
appeals deemed it unnecessary to determine the constitutionality of the statute for the road-
block itself pursuant to the Prouse analysis. Id. In two cases during the Survey period, the
Dallas Court of Appeals followed Meeks in striking down ostensible drivers license roadblocks
as subterfuge DWI roadblocks when the circumstances made it clear that checking for driver
sobriety was at least a primary purpose of the checkpoints, despite the officers' testimony to the
contrary. See Higbie v. State, 723 S.W.2d 802, 803-04 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.);
Padgett v. State, 723 S.W.2d 780, 781-82 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no pet.). In a number of
pre-Prouse opinions, the court of criminal appeals upheld the validity of stops under art.
6687b, § 13, when police made the stops solely to determine whether the driver possessed a
valid driver's license or to determine the fitness of the driver and vehicle. See, e.g., Luckett v.
State, 586 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (officer suspected driver did not have
license); Rezo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (license check roadblock);
Tardiff v. State, 548 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (license check roadblock); Leo-
nard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (police stopped vehicle solely for
license check); Oliver v. State, 455 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (routine license
check).
70. 739 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
71. The state actually argued in the first instance that the record supported the conclusion
that the roadblock was ostensibly a driver's license checkpoint. The officer who coordinated
the roadblock, however, admitted that the real purpose of the roadblock was to ferret out DWI
offenders.
72. 695 S.W.2d 676, 683 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no pet.).
73. 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979).
74. Id. at 50-51. The Court designed this three-pronged mode of analysis to assure that
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its burden of proof as to each element of the Brown test.75
The court of criminal appeals unanimously struck down the Webb road-
block, but did so in such a fashion that it raised more questions than it an-
swered. The court's opinion, written by Justice Davis, generally followed
the court of appeals' analysis, but only one other judge joined the opinion.76
All seven remaining judges of the court concurred in the result only.77
Thus, while the court has shed no light on what types of roadblocks, if any,
the police can constitutionally employ to catch DWI offenders, it has at least
made clear that the type of sense check roadblock used as subterfuge for
DWI check in Webb is constitutionally impermissible. 78
The Webb roadblock was a temporary one during which police stopped
every vehicle on a particular street for a brief time period, primarily, but not
exclusively, to check for DWI offenders. 79 No prior publicity occurred be-
forehand, and little if any illumination or other warning existed on the street
to approaching drivers, thus subjecting oncoming motorists to a high degree
of anxiety by virtue of the surprise and unexpected police roadblock.80 The
state introduced no evidence through empirical data or otherwise to prove
up the necessity for or the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoint deterrence as
opposed to traditional means of deterring drunk drivers. 81 Finally, and per-
haps most significantly, the state did not show evidence in Webb that the
police used an objective, non-discretionary procedure to conduct the road-
block, such as formal, neutral guidelines formulated by superior law enforce-
ment officials. 82
officers in the field cannot arbitrarily invade an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
695 S.W.2d at 678 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S., 648, 654-55 (1979); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-83 (1975); Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-
33 (1967)).
75. 695 S.W.2d at 681-83. The prosecution has the burden of proof to show facts author-
izing a warrantless seizure. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1971);
DeLao v. State, 550 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
76. 739 S.W.2d at 803. (Campbell, J., joined in court's opinion, Davis, J.).
77. Id. at 812 Justices Onion, McCormick, and White concurred in the result without
explanation. Justices Clinton, Miller, and Duncan joined only in the opinion's introduction of
the case and recitation of the facts, but in none of the opinion's legal analysis. Justice Teague
concurred only in the result, explaining that he would adopt the Court of Appeals' analysis "in
principle." Id. The court modified the Dallas Court of Appeals' disposition of the case from
reversal and acquittal to reversal and remand. Id.
78. Id. The plurality opinion found the roadblock objectionable under both the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 9 of the Texas Constitution. Id.
The appellant in Webb relied upon both provisions in attacking the validity of the roadblock,
although the court of appeals' analysis appeared to involve only an interpretation of the stric-
tures of the Fourth Amendment. See 695 S.W.2d at 683.
79. 793 S.W.2d at 804; 695 S.W.2d at 682, 683.
80. 793 S.W.2d at 810.
81. Id. at 15. The plurality opinion observed that an increased number of highly visible
patrols watching for erratic driving may have been a more effective and economical means of
apprehending drunk drivers than a roadblock. Id. (citing Jacobs and Strossen, Mass Investiga-
tion Without Individualized Suspicion: A Constitutional and Policy Critique of Drunk Driving
Roadblocks, 18 U.C.D.I. REV. 595, 645-49 (1985).
82. Id. at 811. The Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure be based on specific, objec-
tive facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular indi-
vidual, or that officers carryout the seizure pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers in the field. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51
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The manner in which the court of criminal appeals disposed of Webb does
not allow for the conclusion that courts will uphold DWI roadblocks as con-
sistent with the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 9 of the U.S. Con-
stitution, even if the record reflects compliance with neutral guidelines, that
police intrusiveness and citizen anxiety were minimized, and that such road-
blocks create a more effective means of apprehending drunk drivers than
other traditional methods.8 3 Resolution of the constitutional issue may not
answer the ultimate question regarding the validity of such roadblocks. The
lack of any specific statutory authority for these warrantless detentions with-
out probable cause would appear to render the roadblocks illegal in any
event, regardless of whether they pass constitutional muster. As the court of
criminal appeals noted several years ago in Meeks, the statute authorizes
detentions only when the sole reason is to check driver's licenses.8 4
V SUPPRESSION PROCEDURE
During the Survey period the court of criminal appeals modified and clari-
fied several procedural rules relating to the preservation of suppression
claims and production requirements at suppression hearings. In Miller v.
State 8 5 the court held that the prosecution has the burden of producing the
affidavit supporting an arrest warrant, not the defendant. 86 Several years
ago in Rumsey v. State,8 7 the court strongly indicated that the state's sole
burden in justifying a challenged arrest based on a warrant required it to
introduce a warrant valid on its face.88 The defendant must then produce
the supporting affidavit for attack on probable cause or other grounds.89
(1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 655-61 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976).
83. A survey of decisions on the issue from other jurisdictions indicates a roughly even
split. A number of recent opinions from other state courts have upheld DWI roadblocks. See
State v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880, 889 (1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529,
673 P.2d 1174, 1186 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Ky. Ct. App.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1105 (1984); Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483
N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (1985); State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131, 135 (1980);
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 473 N.E.2d 1, 5-6 (N.Y. 1984). Other state courts, however,
have found the conduct of the DWI roadblock in question violative of the Fourth Amendment.
See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983); State v.
McLoughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125, 1141-42 (Ind, App. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan,
389 Miss. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 979-80, 983 (N.H.
1985) (court noted that its state constitution provides more protection than the Fourth
Amendment against state intrusion); State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562, 665 (Okla. Crim. App.
1984); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 395 S.D. 1976); State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d
434, 706 P.2d 225, 227-28 (1985). The decisions do not necessarily reveal per se acceptance or
rejection of such roadblocks because of the differences in roadblock operation and specific
evidence introduced in each case.
84. 692 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
85. 736 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
86. Id. at 648.
87. 675 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
88. Id. at 520-21.
89. Id. This language in Rumsey appears to conflict with several previous decisions by the
court that arguably placed the burden of producing the affidavit on the state. See Gant v.




The burden of justifying a contested arrest lies on the state.90 If the suffi-
ciency of warrant depends on the sufficiency of the supporting affidavit, it
makes no sense to relieve the state from producing the affidavit to the trial
court for a determination of its sufficiency. The court overruled Rumsey,
noting that placing the burden of production of the affidavit on the defend-
ant was inconsistent with the state's general burden of proof.9 1 The Miller
court thus held that in addition to producing the arrest warrant the state
must also carry the burden of producing the supporting affidavit for inspec-
tion in the trial court.92 The court, however, reaffirmed the established rule
that the defendant must see that the warrant and supporting affidavit are in
the record if they are to be reviewed on appeal. 93 These rules apply equally
to suppression hearings involving contested search warrants. 94
In Polk v. State 9 5 the court of criminal appeals made clear that a defend-
ant need not specifically invoke the state statutory exclusionary rule96 in the
trial court in order to preserve suppression error on state law grounds. 97
The police in Polk suspected the defendant of a recent. murder and arrested
him on an outstanding ticket in order to question him about the homicide. 9 8
The complaint supporting the outstanding ticket warrant was defective,
however, for failure to state a date.99 An hour after his arrest the defendant
gave a confession, portions of which the state introduced into evidence at
trial over objection. 10 0 The court of appeals held that this defect in the com-
plaint supporting the warrant rendered the arrest illegal as violative of state
statute and found the resultant confession inadmissible by virtue of the state
statutory exclusionary rule embodied in article 38.23 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.101 The court of appeals also expressly declined to en-
graft onto article 38.23 the good faith exception adopted by the Supreme
90. Gant, 649 S.W.2d at 32.
91. 736 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
92. Id.
93. Id.; see Haynes v. State, 468 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Dusek v. State,
467 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
94. See Ortega v. State, 464 S.W.2d 876, 878-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
95. 738 S.W.2d 274, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
97. 738 S.W.2d at 276.
98. Id. at 275; Polk v. State, 704 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, pet. granted).
Although neither the court of appeals nor the court of criminal appeals addressed the issue, the
factual scenario reported in Polk would appear to fall neatly within the pretext arrest prohibi-
tion embraced by the court of criminal appeals in Black v. State during the Survey period. The
resultant confession would therefore have been inadmissible on this basis regardless of the
courts' interpretation of former art. 38.23. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
99. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 15.05 (Vernon 1987). This article requires the inclusion
of the date on which the offense is alleged to have been committed in all arrest warrant com-
plaints. Id.
100. 738 S.W.2d at 275. The court of appeals concluded that the state failed to show that
the taint of the arrest on the defendant's confession was attenuated. Id. See Polk, 704 S.W.2d
at 933 (finding not disturbed by the court of criminal appeals).
101. 704 S.W.2d at 934-35; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) provides:
no evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions
of the constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of
the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused
on the trial of any criminal case.
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Court in United States v. Leon 102 with regard to Fourth Amendment viola-
tions. 103 In the court of criminal appeals the state argued that the defendant
nevertheless waived his right to rely on article 38.23 for suppression by fail-
ing to specifically invoke the statute in the trial court.' ° 4 The high court
unanimously rejected this contention, noting that article 38.23 is not an in-
dependent basis for objecting to admission of evidence, but is a procedural
result that applies after a judge sustains an objection to the admission of
evidence. 10 5
102. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
103. 704 S.W.2d at 933-34.
104. 738 S.W.2d at 275. The state contended that Nelson v. State, 607 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980), requires defendants to specifically invoke art. 38.23 of Code of Criminal
Procedure in the trial court to preserve error on that ground for appeal. In Nelson, however,
the court merely held that the defendant had waived error by failure to invoke any Texas
statutory or constitutional grounds for suppression in the trial court. Id. at 555.
105. 738 S.W.2d at 276. Federal law does not require a defendant to specifically object on
the basis of the federal exclusionary rule; he need only object to the admissibility of the evi-
dence on the ground that police obtained the evidence through a search or seizure that violated
the Fourth Amendment to invoke the federal exclusionary rule. See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-76 (1969); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961); Goldstein v.
United States, 316 U.S. 114, 120 (1942). A federal defendant need not specifically state that
his ground for exclusion is the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914); because there is no other federal exclusionary rule. The defendant need only state
federal grounds for excluding evidence; invocation of the federal exclusionary rule is
automatic.
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